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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3894 
_____________ 
 
ANGELIQUE PRIMUS, 
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TARGET CORPORATION 
_____________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-11-cv-04648 
District Judge: The Honorable Berle M. Schiller 
_____________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 16, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 8, 2013) 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
Angelique Primus was injured while shopping at Target in Warrington, 
Pennsylvania. For reasons unknown, a box of unassembled furniture fell on her 
 
2 
 
hand. She sued Target Corporation for negligence. Her theory was simple: Target 
used a safety arm to keep the boxes on its shelves, but it should have used a fence. 
In support of this theory, Primus introduced evidence that fences are safer than 
safety arms (because boxes can slide under safety arms). In response, Target intro-
duced evidence that safety arms are safer than fences (because shoppers can injure 
themselves while lifting boxes over fences). After thirty-four minutes of delibera-
tion, the jury reached a verdict: Target was not negligent. This appeal followed.*
Primus objects to a pair of evidentiary rulings. The rulings excluded evi-
dence that was meant to contradict—and thereby impeach—Target’s witnesses. 
Primus’s two objections share the same fatal flaw. The evidence at issue did not 
contradict any witness. 
 
We review the District Court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2005). Federal 
Rule of Evidence 607 allows a party to impeach witnesses by contradicting their 
testimonies. United States v. Gilmore, 553 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 932 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Although im-
peachment by contradiction is not specifically formalized in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, it is part of the general body of evidentiary law and is a permissible the-
                                           
* The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and 
we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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ory of impeachment under Federal Rule of Evidence 607.”). “Impeachment by 
contradiction is a means of policing the [witness]’s obligation to speak the truth in 
response to proper questions.” Gilmore, 553 F.3d at 271 (quotation marks omitted). 
Impeachment-by-contradiction evidence must satisfy the Rule 403 balancing re-
quirement. See id. Above all, such evidence must “meaningfully contradict[]”—or 
be inconsistent with—a witness’s testimony. Morgan v. Covington Twp., 648 F.3d 
172, 181 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). 
The first ruling excluded photos that Primus’s counsel had taken at a local 
Target—not the Target where Primus was injured. The photos showed that the 
store used fences rather than safety arms to display some boxes of furniture. J.A. 
487–504. The District Court excluded the photos because they had not been au-
thenticated. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Authenticated or not, the photos had a bigger 
problem: they did not in fact contradict any witness’s testimony. Primus tried to 
introduce the photos to contradict a Target witness who had said that “I would not 
consider [a waist-level fence that displayed furniture boxes] safe.” J.A. 406–07. 
Yet the possibility that such fences are unsafe is entirely consistent with the possi-
bility that Target used them. Stores occasionally do things that are unsafe. Absent 
an actual contradiction, the evidence could not impeach by contradiction. 
The second ruling was proper for the same reason. Primus tried to prove that 
Target could eliminate the risk of fences by leaving gaps, which would allow cus-
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tomers to remove boxes by sliding rather than lifting them. In a pretrial deposition, 
Target’s expert had testified that gaps “would negate the lift.” J.A. 54. Primus tried 
to introduce this testimony to impeach a Target representative who had indicated 
that “fencing can certainly be placed with spaces between it.” J.A. 318. Target ob-
jected, and the District Court ruled that Primus should raise the issue when the ex-
pert testified. That did not happen—the expert never testified, and Primus never 
mentioned his testimony again. The problem here is the same as before. The ex-
pert’s testimony did not contradict anything that the Target representative had said. 
The expert simply said that gaps “would negate the lift.” No one ever said other-
wise. The expert’s testimony was therefore inadmissible to impeach by contradic-
tion.  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion. We will affirm its judgment. 
 
